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Abstract
Since transitioning to capitalism in 1990, Mongolia’s wildlife has faced
growing threats from the development of infrastructure, increasing livestock
populations, and the expansion of an illegal trade in wildlife products. As wildlife
populations face these growing risks, Mongolia needs to develop and implement
strong wildlife management practices, including tighter enforcement of existing
wildlife trade laws, more frequent wildlife population studies, and better legislation.
However, these revisions will require significant funding. Trophy hunting, the system
through which the Mongolian government sells wealthy foreigners expensive permits
to hunt species like argali, ibex, wolf, and roe deer, may be a major source for these
funds. While conservationists around the world argue that trophy hunting can support
wildlife protection, Mongolia’s trophy hunting has failed to do so over much of its
history due to corruption, a weak scientific basis, a lack of benefit to local
communities, and a failure to direct revenue back to conservation. However, a
number of revisions were made to Mongolia’s trophy hunting system in 2012 that
may have improved its potential to serve as a conservation tool.
In this report, I investigate these changes and the current management of
trophy hunting in Mongolia. Is trophy hunting now better protecting Mongolia’s
wildlife? After performing an extensive literature review and speaking with
government officials, conservationists, and hunting company representatives in
Ulaanbaatar, I visited Tsetseg soum (district) in Khovd aimag (province) to
investigate the real-world implications of trophy hunting by speaking to local
community members and government officials. In total, I performed twenty-four
interviews. Over the course of this research, I found that while the 2012 revisions to
Mongolia’s trophy hunting significantly improved the system’s potential to support
wildlife conservation, reducing the potential for corruption, increasing its ecological
sustainability, and linking it more closely to local communities, it will not effectively
support wildlife conservation until stakeholders’ capacity increases, local community
members feel involved and valued, and local governments properly redirect revenue
back to wildlife conservation.
Keywords: Forestry and wildlife, Natural resources and conservation, Public and
social welfare
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III. Introduction
Since opening itself to foreign trade and development following its
transition to democracy in 1990, Mongolia has faced serious and growing
threats to its wildlife. First, wildlife habitats and populations are increasingly
fragmented by the development of infrastructure associated with everspreading mining projects, and revenues from mining and development make
it increasingly difficult to devote land to protected areas for wildlife (ChimedOchir et al, 2010). Next, the privatization of livestock in the early 1990s has
created incentives for increasing herd sizes, putting pressure on pastureland
that damages habitat and food sources for wildlife populations (Chimed-Ochir
et al, 2010). Finally, since opening its borders to Chinese markets and doing
away with the strict hunting and trade regulations of the socialist period,
Mongolia has become home to an active illegal trade in game meat, furs, and
wildlife-based medicinal products (World Bank, 2010). This trade contributed
almost $100 million to Mongolia’s economy in 2004, and it drives illegal
poaching of many wildlife species (Wingard and Zahler, 2006). Taken
together, these threats have had significant impacts on the populations of
many species found throughout Mongolia. For example, Mongolia’s
population of red deer fell from 130,000 to only between 8,000 and 10,000
between 1986 and 2004, a decrease of 92% (Chimed-Ochir et al, 2010), and
the population of Mongolian marmots dropped from 20 million in 1990 to
only 5 million in 2002 (Wingard and Zahler, 2006).
Faced by these huge losses, Mongolia needs to develop and implement
strong wildlife management practices, including tighter enforcement of
existing wildlife trade laws, more frequent wildlife population studies, and
better wildlife legislation. However, improvements in wildlife management
will only succeed if they have adequate funding, which currently is in short
supply; the Mongolian state’s budget for 2015 makes the MEGDT the second
least funded ministry in the Mongolian government, behind only the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Economic Cooperation (UB Post, November 17, 2014).
However, other funding sources may exist. Indeed, in their 2006 Silent Steppe
report on the wildlife trade in Mongolia, Zahler and Wingard point to trophy
hunting as a source of funding that could underpin and revitalize wildlife
conservation in Mongolia.
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Trophy hunting is a legal system in which hunters pay to select and kill

animals in order to obtain some kind of trophy, like the skin, antlers, or head.
Trophy hunting became legal in Mongolia in 1967, and by 2009 foreign
hunters had harvested about 2000 argali and more than 10,000 ibex, two of the
most prized trophies (World Bank, 2009). Each year, the Mongolian
government promotes and sells a certain number of licenses for trophy hunting
of various Mongolian wildlife species, including Altai and Gobi Argali sheep
(Ovis ammon), Siberian ibex (Capra sibirica), Gray wolf (Canis lupus), Roe
deer (Capreolus pygargus), and Wild boar (Sus scrofa), which hunting and
tourism companies then use to host hunting tours for wealthy foreign tourists.
Despite the range of species for which trophy hunting occurs, argali trophy
hunting has long been the focus of both conservationists and foreign hunters.
While it is difficult to find historical data on Mongolia’s trophy
hunting quotas, or the maximum number of hunting licenses to be issued each
year, all exports of argali trophies must receive a permit from the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), so CITES export data for argali serves as a reasonable proxy for the
volume of Mongolia’s trophy hunting industry over time (see Table 1)
(Zakharenka, 2008).
Figure 1. CITES Exports of Argali Trophies from Mongolia
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Throughout this history, these trophy hunts have been attached to significant
government fees, which currently range from $8 for geese to $18,000 for Altai
argali. This flow of revenue has long had the potential to support wildlife
protection in Mongolia, but for many years it has failed to do so.
In a series of reports between 2002 and 2012, environmental
organizations and scientists described the extensive flaws both in the legal
framework and implementation of Mongolia’s trophy hunting system. First,
while the legal mechanisms existed such that trophy hunting fees should
benefit wildlife conservation, the government was failing to enforce these
mechanisms. Though the Mongolian Law on Reinvestment of Natural
Resource Use Fees required that the government reinvest 50% of trophy
hunting revenue in wildlife conservation, it was not doing so (Wingard and
Zahler, 2006). For example, while trophy hunting and Saker falcon (Falco
cherrug) fees totaled about $4.1 million in 2004, and thus more than $2
million should have been allocated to wildlife management, only $545,000
was actually made available (Wingard and Zahler, 2006). In fact, there were
widespread concerns that instead of funding wildlife protection, trophy
hunting revenues were going to a few politicians and their subsidiaries, along
with a certain portion of hunting permits (Amgalanbaatar et al., 2002).
Besides failing to fund general wildlife protection as a whole, trophy
hunting has been unsustainable both for the target species and local
communities. A series of studies in the early 2000s found that though
Mongolia’s environmental ministry is required to set quotas with input from
the Institute of Biology, it was setting quotas far above their recommendations
(Wingard and Zahler, 2006). Furthermore, the government’s failure to provide
funds for animal population studies meant that even the Institute’s
recommendations for government quotas were based on anecdotal evidence
from herders around Mongolia, out-of-date population surveys, and
guesswork, rather than accurate studies of species populations and herd
structure (Schuerholz, 2001). Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
Amgalanbaatar et al. (2002) write that government financing regulations were
denying local communities all benefit from trophy hunting in their areas.
While trophy hunting companies might hire a few local guides and cooks, they
were not required to invest in local communities in any way, and government
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financing mechanisms meant that the presence of trophy hunting in a soum
might detract from, rather than add to, its budget.
In May 2012, the Mongolian government reworked the laws
surrounding trophy hunting, combining the Law on Hunting, Law on Hunting
and Trapping Fees, Law on Fauna, and Law on Reinvestment of Natural
Resource Use Fees for the Protection the Environment and the Restoration of
Natural Resources into the revised Law on Fauna and the new Law on Natural
Resource Use Fees (WWF Mongolia, 2013b). Together, these revisions
confined trophy hunting to designated hunting reserve zones, changed the
systems for setting quotas and allocating licenses to companies, and redirected
hunting fees from the national budget to soum budgets. To my knowledge, no
studies have as yet evaluated the success of these revisions to Mongolia’s
trophy hunting system. In this study, I seek to address this gap by
investigating the current management of trophy hunting in Mongolia.
Following the 2012 revisions to the system, does trophy hunting threaten or
protect wildlife species in Mongolia? Does it benefit local communities? In
particular, is trophy hunting supporting wildlife conservation in Mongolia? If
not, how can it better do so in the future?
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IV. Methods
Overall, I investigated trophy hunting in Mongolia by studying
Mongolian laws, reading literature on trophy hunting in Mongolia and around
the world, and interviewing stakeholders in the trophy hunting system. These
stakeholders included national and local government officials, wildlife
conservationists, hunting guides, and local community members. Through this
process, I sought to understand both the legislative framework for trophy
hunting in Mongolia and how trophy hunting functions in the real world.
I began my research in Ulaanbaatar, where I first sought to create a
conceptual framework for my study of Mongolia’s trophy hunting system.
Conservationists have explored the potential for trophy hunting to support
conservation around the world since the 1980s, and I reviewed the many
professional journal publications, magazine articles, and position papers that
compose this debate. After establishing the theoretical basis for my study, I
investigated the structure and workings of Mongolia’s trophy hunting system,
both before and after the 2012 changes to the system. First, I carefully studied
Mongolia’s laws regulating trophy hunting, both before and after the 2012
revisions to the Law on Fauna and the enactment of the Law on Natural
Resource Use Fees. While the laws published before 2012 were available in
English, I had the revised laws translated into English before reviewing them.
During this period, I also read all of the available secondary sources reporting
on Mongolia’s trophy hunting system. These resources were primarily journal
publications, both by American and Mongolian researchers, and reports
published by environmental organizations working in Mongolia, like the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the Wildlife Conservation Society
(WCS).
Besides studying the volumes of written material on trophy hunting in
Mongolia, I devoted much of my time in Ulaanbaatar to interviews with
people involved in trophy hunting management. These interviewees included a
specialist from the national Ministry of Environment, Green Development,
and Tourism (MEGDT), conservationists from WWF, a representative from
the Mongolian Professional Hunters’ Association, the director of a trophy
hunting company, and several wildlife biologists. After getting contact
information for interviewees from my advisor and teachers, I contacted most
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of these interviewees by phone and email. In total, I interviewed eight people
during my time in Ulaanbaatar. During these interviews, I asked stakeholders
about specific changes in the trophy hunting system, for their opinions on the
success of the current system, and for their recommendations for future
changes in the system. Please see Appendix A for sample interview questions.
All but one of these interviews were in English, and I hired a translator from
SIT to assist with my one interview in Mongolian. Over the course of these
interviews and my literature research while in Ulaanbaatar, I compiled both a
comprehensive technical understanding of trophy hunting in Mongolia and a
sense for what most stakeholders see as the primary benefits and flaws of the
current system.
However, I ran into several obstacles in this process, primarily in
setting up interviews, which may have prevented me from capturing the full
range of stakeholders involved in trophy hunting. First, several representatives
both of hunting organizations and wildlife organizations demanded that I pay
them for an interview, and then were unwilling to accept the price that I
offered. Furthermore, I was unable to meet with any representatives of the
Mongolian Hunters’ Association, who claimed to all be too busy to meet with
me or away from Ulaanbaatar for the duration of my study. I had similarly
poor luck in my attempts to set up interviews with representatives of the
National Police Agency of Mongolia, who said that their work was classified
and thus they could not speak with me. In total, I interviewed eight people
during my time in Ulaanbaatar, though I contacted more than eighteen.
Besides this trouble with setting up interviews, I struggled to obtain data on
trophy hunting from the MEGDT. While I requested data on quotas, trophy
hunting revenue, and reinvestment of this revenue, the ministry only provided
me with limited data on trophy hunting quotas. I did my best to piece together
data from books available from the National Statistical Office of Mongolia,
but I was largely unable to do so. I think that my lack of concrete national data
on trophy hunting is a major shortcoming in my study.
After establishing a solid theoretical understanding of Mongolia’s
trophy hunting system, I visited Khovd aimag, or Khovd province, to study
how trophy hunting plays out in the real world. In particular, I wanted to
investigate how trophy hunting affects local communities and wildlife
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populations. Khovd has hosted foreign trophy hunters for many years and thus
was a suitable study subject. Furthermore, WWF has a field office in the
Khovd aimag center, which proved to be a valuable resource for my research.
I first stayed in the Khovd aimag center for two days, where I interviewed
representatives from the WWF field office, representatives of Altain
Nuudelchid, the organization responsible for hunting management in the area,
and several officials from Khovd’s Department of Environment. I had
arranged to meet with WWF before travelling to Khovd, and I arranged to
meet with the other interviewees by approaching them in their offices. I did a
total of six interviews in the aimag center, which provided a thorough
introduction to trophy hunting administration and wildlife health in the area.
Please see Appendix B for sample interview questions. All of these interviews
were in Mongolian, so I worked through a local translator from the University
of Khovd.
Next, I traveled to Tsetseg soum, or district, for one day to better
understand the local reality of trophy hunting. I chose to visit Tsetseg both
because it has had a trophy hunting industry for many years and because the
local authorities were receptive to my coming when I contacted them in April.
While I hoped to spend a longer time in Tsetseg or travel to multiple soums,
the timing of buses between Khovd and Tsetseg made that impossible. During
my time in Tsetseg, I interviewed both people directly involved in trophy
hunting operations and management, like the local coordinator for trophy
hunts, a local guide for foreign hunters, and government officials, and seven
Tsetseg residents not necessarily connected to trophy hunting. While I was
unable to interview the Tsetseg governor while in Tsetseg, I met with him
when he visited Ulaanbaatar. This range of interviewees allowed me to
investigate the operations of trophy hunting, the health of local ibex and argali
populations, the local government’s role in wildlife protection, and local
perceptions of trophy hunting. While in Tsetseg, I interviewed a total of ten
people. Please see Appendix C for sample interview questions. All of these
interviews were in Mongolian, so I worked through a translator from the
University of Khovd.
Despite this range of viewpoints, my interviews in Tsetseg soum were
somewhat limited in scope due to my time constraints. First, I wanted to
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interview many more community members than I did, but unfortunately I had
to leave Tsetseg earlier than I had planned due to my bus driver’s demands.
Next, my sample of local residents was not random, but rather was based on
convenience. I interviewed five of the seven local interviewees while on the
bus rides between Khovd and Tsetseg, and the other two interviewees were
the first two people that I encountered on the main street of Tsetseg. Next, six
of these seven interviewees lived in the soum center, so I did not get a
satisfactory sample of Tsetseg herders. Also, most of my local interviewees
were men, unfortunately, partly because of convenience and partly because
men naturally presented themselves to be interviewed over women.
Despite these and other limitations, I believe that this research process
provided me with a strong understanding both of the structure of Mongolia’s
revised trophy hunting system and the local realities of that system. Based on
my understanding of the primary flaws remaining in Mongolia’s trophy
hunting system, I then formulated a series of proposals for future
improvements to the system.
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V. Study Area
After performing a series of interviews in Ulaanbaatar, I carried out
several days of fieldwork in Khovd aimag, which is about 1,580 km from
Ulaanbaatar (see Map 1). According to the National Statistical Office of
Mongolia, the total population of Khovd aimag was 81,479 in 2014, 68.5% of
which lived in rural areas. Last year, Khovd’s 11,287 herding households
collectively owned a total of 2,625,577 animals, including camels, horses,
cows, sheep, and goats (National Statistical Office of Mongolia).
Map 1. Khovd Aimag Center and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia

Khovd Aimag
Center

Ulaanbaatar

1000 km

Source: Wikipedia Commons, 2011
The Altai Mountains, which are home to some of Mongolia’s primary
trophy hunting species, including Altai argali and ibex, pass through Khovd,
so Khovd has been a prime trophy hunting destination for many years.
However, argali trophy hunting has been banned in Khovd for the last four
years due to struggling argali populations (Yo. Onon). In contrast, ibex
populations in Khovd remain strong, and 5 soums in Khovd received a total of
37 permits to hunt ibex in 2015 (MEGDT, 2015).
Besides staying in the Khovd aimag center, I traveled to Tsetseg soum,
one of the 17 soums in Khovd aimag. Tsetseg, whose soum center is about 231
km from the Khovd aimag center, had a population of 2,850 in 2014 (see Map
2). Last year, Tsetseg had 460 herding households who collectively owned a
total of 112,039 animals (National Statistical Office of Mongolia). According
to the governor of Tsetseg soum, there has been trophy hunting in Tsetseg
since 1940, and it continues to this day. Indeed, Tsetseg residents and

	
  

10

politicians were very proud to report that an argali with 58-inch horns was
once hunted in Tsetseg, setting a record that has not yet been broken.
Map 2. Tsetseg Soum in Khovd Aimag
While Tsetseg soum has
historically been renowned for its
argali hunting, it’s argali
Khovd Aimag
Center

population fell significantly in
the early 2000s following several
years of poor weather, and it is

Tsetseg

still recovering. In 2013, a study
of argali populations in Tsetseg
by Altain Nuudelchid, a local
NGO, found a total population of
186 argali, 31.2% of which were

40 km

adult males, 34.4% of which
were adult females, 22.0% of

Source: Wikipedia Commons, 2013

which were lambs, and 12.4% of

which were ewes. Because of this low population, Tsetseg has not received
any permits for argali hunting for the last four years (D. Tsogbadrakh).
However, ibex populations remain strong in Tsetseg, and ibex trophy hunting
continues. Altain Nuudelchid’s 2013 study found a total population of 276
ibex, 47.4% of which were adult males, 26.7% of which were adult females,
10.5% of which were yearlings, and 15.4% of which were kids. Based on this
population data, Tsetseg soum received 9 permits to hunt ibex in 2015
(MEGDT, 2015).
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VI. Conceptual Framework: Trophy Hunting as a Tool for Conservation
Trophy hunting is legal in countries all over the world, from hunts of
brown bears in Croatia to hunts of pumas in South America (Hofer, 2002).
Trophy hunting is particularly common in Africa, where foreigners can travel
to 23 countries to legally hunt big game. South Africa has the largest hunting
industry in the world, with annual revenue greater than $100 million (Lindsey,
2006). Trophy hunting remains controversial despite this prevalence, and there
is currently an active debate on the industry’s role in sustainable wildlife
policy. Since the 1980s and 1990s, many conservationists have argued that
trophy hunting can actually protect wildlife around the world, and they point
to success stories in which trophy hunting has led to significant increase in
wildlife populations. For example, the IUCN African Rhino Specialist Group
reports that since trophy hunting of white rhinoceros was legalized in South
Africa in 1968, white rhino populations have increased from only 1,800 to
over 20,000 today (Save the Rhino Foundation, N.D.). According to
conservationists, trophy hunting can benefit wildlife conservation both as a
source of significant revenue and by incentivizing wildlife protection and
sustainable management.
First, trophy hunting can serve as a significant source of funding for
wildlife management and conservation. Foreign hunters, many of them from
the United States, pay thousands of dollars to hunt rare animals around the
world. According to African Sky Hunting’s price list, 2015 trophy fees for
South African animals reach up to $23,000 for lions and $42,000 for
elephants. While hunting companies collect any funds paid in excess of these
fees, the revenue from license fees typically flows to the government. If
properly managed, these funds could be devoted to conservation programs
both for game species and for other wildlife. Indeed, many countries have
legal mechanisms in place to divert trophy hunting revenues to wildlife
conservation. For example, all trophy hunting in the United States is subject to
an 11% tax under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937, the
proceeds of which are dedicated to conservation under the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (Macdonald and Service, 2003). Similarly, in Zambia, 50%
of license fees and all hunting rights fees go to a wildlife conservation
revolving fund (Lewis et al., 1997). In addition to these government
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mechanisms for reinvestment of trophy hunting revenue in wildlife
conservation, some countries require trophy hunting companies to contribute a
certain portion of their profits to wildlife protection (Lindsey et al., 2007).
In particular, trophy hunting may generate revenue to support
conservation in areas that aren’t suitable for traditional photographic tourism,
like areas without infrastructure, attractive scenery, or a high density of
photogenic wildlife (Lindsey et al. 2007). Furthermore, trophy hunting
generates more revenue per tourist than traditional forms of tourism. In 1995,
Chardonnet found that trophy hunting revenues per client were 30 and 14
times greater than those per photographic tourism client in Zimbabwe and
Tanzania, respectively. Thus, trophy hunting generates more money with less
of the fossil fuel use, habitat disturbance, and environmental degradation
associated with high traffic of visitors (Gossling 2000).
Most significantly, trophy hunting can encourage wildlife conservation
by creating economic incentives for wildlife protection. First, it can fuel
conservation by tying the economic interests of government, local
communities, and hunting companies to the health of wildlife populations.
Trophy hunting generally creates revenue for governments, creates high
profits for hunting companies, and can benefit local communities if proper
mechanisms exist to redirect funds to them. All of these beneficiaries of the
trophy hunting system have an incentive to ensure that the system is
sustainable, and that they will thus continue to benefit from it. These
incentives can work through many paths. First, trophy hunting creates
economic incentives for the use of sustainable offtake levels, or the number of
animals harvested. In a 2007 paper on trophy hunting in sub-Saharan Africa,
Lindsey et al. write that trophy hunting is “inherently self-regulating” because
offtake must be sufficiently modest to ensure the availability of high quality
trophies in the future. Besides ensuring that stakeholders will seek appropriate
offtake levels, trophy hunting provides an incentive for all stakeholders in the
system to curb threats to the health of game populations, like poaching
(Lindsey, 2007). Particularly in areas where wildlife conservation represents a
significant cost to local communities by restricting their access to customary
foods and materials or where wildlife may threaten crops, revenue from trophy
hunting that offsets these costs can significantly reduce threats to wildlife
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populations from illegal hunting or irresponsible community use (Lewis and
Alpert, 1997). Trophy hunting can change animals from burdens on local
communities to valuable assets, thus encouraging their protection.
In the same sense, trophy hunting produces a strong incentive for the
dedication of land to wildlife conservation. In a 2009 chapter in “Key Topics
in Conservation Biology,” David Macdonald and Katrina Service write that
hunters have been tied to habitat protection throughout the history of sport
hunting. For example, they write, concern from hunters in the British colonies
over widespread destruction of game habitats and populations led to the
creation of parks and animal reserves (2009). Besides encouraging land
protection among hunters invested in the sport, however, trophy hunting and
the revenue it creates can provide a strong financial incentive for expansion of
wildlife habitat, whether on private, state-owned, or communally-owned land.
By creating a source of revenue from wildlife conservation, trophy hunting
makes wildlife conservation economically viable as a use of land in
comparison to land uses like agriculture or development. This incentive
towards conservation is particularly visible in treatment of private land.
During the 1960s and 1970s, legislative changes in much of southern Africa
gave landowners ownership of wildlife and/or the right to derive income from
hunting. Propelled by the profit to be made under trophy hunting, many
landowners transitioned from livestock ranching to game ranching,
significantly increasing wildlife habitats (Lindsey 2007). In Zimbabwe, for
example, 27,000 km2 of livestock ranches were converted to game ranches
following these legislative changes, a transition that has been associated with a
quadrupling of wildlife populations there (Bond et al., 2004).
While these mechanisms through which trophy hunting might benefit
conservation are likely significant, there is by no means a consensus that
trophy hunting does indeed protect wildlife. First, some conservationists and
animal rights activists oppose trophy hunting on moral grounds. While many
conservationists and writers condone hunting for self-protection, food, or for
the sake of cultural tradition, few support the killing of rare animals solely for
the sake of a wealthy foreigner’s enjoyment or pride (Gunn, 2001). Indeed,
trophy hunting tends to provoke strong emotional responses when it surfaces
on public media, particularly when it surrounds young huntresses. For
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example, after L’Oreal signed a contract with 17-year old Belgian Axelle
Despiegelaere when she was discovered at a 2014 World Cup soccer game,
they quickly terminated it when photos of her posing with a dead animal in
Africa surfaced online (Tadeo, 2014, July 11). Similarly, 19-year old Kendall
Jones, a Texan cheerleader, was the subject of a media frenzy and death
threats after posting pictures on Facebook of herself with animals she had
hunted in Africa (Williams, 2014, July 2). For many, these ethical
considerations nullify any potential that trophy hunting might have to benefit
wildlife. In a post titled “Stop Senseless Trophy Hunting” for the Huffington
Post, Jeffrey Flocken, the North American Regional Director for the
International Fund for Animal Welfare, condemns trophy hunting for
conservation because “a bullet is a bullet, whether it comes from the barrel of
a rich American or a Sudanese militant” (Jeffrey Flocken, 2015). According to
Flocken and other animal rights activists, killing animals to conserve them is a
contradiction in terms; sacrificing animals for sport can never be part of
wildlife protection.
While some object to trophy hunting on principle, much of the
opposition to trophy hunting as a tool for conservation centers on problems of
poor implementation. First, scientists have pointed to the possibility that
trophy hunting changes the genetic composition of wildlife populations when
conducted without restrictions on target age. While some countries, like
Tanzania, restrict trophy hunting to animals of a certain age, others do not
(Lindsey, 2013). In a study of trophy hunting in Alberta, Canada between
1975 and 2003, Coltman et al. (2003) find that trophy hunted rams tended to
be heavier and have longer horns than others, as expected, and that they
tended to be killed before their reproductive peak. In response to the
elimination of these rams from the gene pool, population averages for horn
size and weight fell over time. Thus, by selectively targeting trophy rams with
high genetic quality before their reproductive peak, unrestricted trophy
hunting may “push traits away from their naturally selected optima” within
wildlife populations (Coltman et al., 2003, p. 657). Besides adversely
affecting the gene pools for target species, trophy hunting can damage wildlife
populations if quota levels are not sufficiently science-based. Wildlife
departments in governments around the world typically lack the resources to
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conduct frequent or careful studies of game populations, which are crucial for
setting sustainable offtake levels. Instead, trophy hunting quotas set by
government may be based on outdated game population surveys, anecdotal
evidence, or guesswork (Lindsey, 2007). Combined with governments’ shortterm economic incentive to create revenue by allowing more hunting, this
poor research basis sometimes leads to inappropriate, and often unsustainably
high, offtake levels. For example, Caro et al. found in 1998 that offtake levels
for lion and leopard were unsustainably high in Tanzania.
In addition to these biological problems, there are several social issues
that frequently arise with poor implementation of trophy hunting systems.
First, the significant sums of money flowing through the trophy hunting
industry create opportunities for corruption at many levels. For example,
governments might give preference to particular operators when granting
permits or land concessions, or local governments or government scouts might
be bribed into overlooking overhunting (Leader-Williams et al., 2009). For
example, Lindsey et al. (2007) cite Duckworth’s 2004 claims that the
Ethiopian Professional Hunting Association is used solely for the benefit of
the country’s president.
Most significantly, though, trophy hunting often fails to serve as a
sustainable wildlife protection program because it does not benefit local
communities. Governments may fail to create and enforce mechanisms
through which to include local communities in quota setting and wildlife
management, revenue from trophy hunting may go to high levels of
government rather than local levels, and communities may lack the capacity to
assist hunting trips or negotiate favorable terms with hunting operators. For
example, Lewis et al. (1997) found that local communities in Zambia received
only 12% of trophy hunting revenue in 1994, largely because they do not own
the wildlife found in the hunting areas in which they live. Also, these local
communities forfeit much of the profit from trophy hunting because they lack
the capacity to deal directly with foreign hunters, and thus they must work
through tour operators.
In assessing the validity of trophy hunting as a tool for conservation, it
is important to distinguish between flaws that are inherent to trophy hunting
and those that could be avoided with proper implementation. While trophy
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hunting systems around the world are troubled by inappropriate quotas,
corruption, and a lack of benefit to local communities, these issues can be
avoided through stronger regulation and better policy. Indeed, the only flaw in
the role of trophy hunting in conservation that cannot be ameliorated with
sound management is that trophy hunting involves killing animals for sport,
which may be morally incompatible with animal protection.
The morality of trophy hunting does not seem to be of particular
concern in Mongolia, where much of the population makes their livelihood off
of raising and then killing animals. While B. Lhagvasuren, a member of
Mongolia’s Institute of Biology, expressed concern that Mongolians see
wildlife as “running meat or horns to sell” rather than “running heritage,” he
and all other individuals that I interviewed supported the idea that trophy
hunting can be a sustainable part of wildlife conservation if it is well managed
and based in science (personal communication, May 8, 2015). Interviewees
frequently pointed to the potential for trophy hunting to create incentives for
the animal protection. Indeed, according to a translation of a 2009 study of
mountain ungulates for the World Bank, “one of the best methods and ways to
protect [species like argali] might be the development of a mechanism that
could increase local people’s interests in protecting [them],” or a system of
“sustainable exploitation” like trophy hunting (11). L. Bayasgalan, a species
specialist for MEGDT, supports this idea, saying, “If there is hunting, many
people will focus on those animals—local communities, herdsmen” (personal
communication, May 7, 2015). Furthermore, while people voice significant
concerns that trophy hunting is not currently funding wildlife protection in
Mongolia, Mongolia’s laws on reinvestment of hunting revenue and the work
of conservation organizations like WWF function around the assumption that
it can and should.
At least in the abstract, then, trophy hunting can support wildlife
conservation in Mongolia. However, according to the body of work on trophy
hunting around the world, it will only do so if it is based on accurate wildlife
monitoring, involves mechanisms to direct funds back to wildlife protection,
has community participation and support, and is implemented by capable
stakeholders.
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VII. 2012 Changes to Mongolia’s Trophy Hunting System
In Mongolia, as in the rest of the world, then, the key to ensuring that
trophy hunting fulfills this potential is to verify that it functions within a
strong regulatory framework. While wildlife biologists and conservationists
largely agreed that Mongolia lacked such a regulatory framework for trophy
hunting before 2012, the legal revisions made that year significantly changed
management of nearly all aspects of the trophy hunting system.
Before these revisions, trophy hunting was primarily regulated by the
Law on Hunting, the Law on Fauna, the Law on Hunting and Trapping Fees,
and the Law on Reinvestment of Natural Resource Use Fees for the Protection
the Environment and the Restoration of Natural Resources. In 2012, the State
Great Khural annulled the Law on Hunting and Trapping Fees, the Law on
Hunting, and the Law on Reinvestment of Natural Resource Use Fees for the
Protection the Environment and the Restoration of Natural Resources,
replacing them with a revised Law on Fauna and the new Law on Natural
Resource Use Fees (WWF Mongolia, 2013). These revisions changed nearly
all aspects of the trophy hunting system. In the following sections, I will
outline and analyze these revisions.
A. Designation of Hunting Reserve Areas
First, and perhaps most significantly, the 2012 revisions restricted
trophy hunting to specific hunting reserve areas. Before these revisions,
hunting companies could lead hunts anywhere, except in protected areas
where hunting was never allowed. There are currently 58 hunting regions in
Mongolia, 40 of which were awarded trophy hunting permits in 2015
(MEGDT, 2015). For example, Tsetseg soum now has three areas reserved for
trophy hunting, which are in the buffer zones for Myaangan Ugalzat National
Park. Kharnuud Olon Khudag is an argali hunting reserve area with a total
area of 380.0 km2, Khajing is an ibex hunting reserve area of 268.3 km2, and
Ikh Belchiir is a marmot hunting reserve area of 125.05 km2 (Altain
Nuudelchid, 2013).
Throughout Mongolia, each of these hunting reserve areas has a
management body, which can be a local non-governmental organization
(NGO), a community-based organization, a partnership between the local
community and a trophy hunting company, or a trophy hunting company alone
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(Yo. Onon, personal communication, May 27, 2015). According to Yo. Onon,
about 10% of hunting reserve areas are managed by local NGOs. For example,
Altain Nuudelchid, a local NGO, manages trophy hunting in Tsetseg soum, as
well as in hunting reserves in Must and Duut soums (Altain Nuudelchid,
2013). Next, about 20% of hunting reserve areas are managed solely by
community-based organizations (Yo. Onon, personal communication, May 27,
2015). For example, in Gulzat area in Uvs aimag, seven community-based
organized have combined to form Gulzat Initiative NGO, which is responsible
for trophy hunting management. While this NGO initially included a variety
of trophy hunting stakeholders, including specialists from the government and
from organizations like WWF, it is now entirely composed of local
community members. This organization now includes 60% of local herders
(B. Munkhchuluun, personal communication, May 21, 2015). Next, about
50% of hunting reserve areas are managed by a cooperative between a hunting
company and the local community, and about 20% of hunting reserves are
managed by hunting companies alone (Yo. Onon, personal communication,
May 27, 2015). For example, I spoke with Zorigt, director for a hunting
company called Ajiinbolor, which is responsible for trophy hunting
management in hunting reserves in several soums in Bayankhongor and
Dornogobi aimags.
Each management body makes a contract with the governor of the
soum in which the hunting reserve area is found, first for one year and then for
10-year increments for a total of up to 30 years. These contracts must be
approved by the aimag’s environmental agency. The hunting reserve area
management body is then responsible for creating a hunting management plan
for the hunting area every four years, incorporating input from a professional
organization. These hunting management plans typically include plans for
reducing threats to the game species, like illegal hunting and pasture
degradation, and for improving pasture conditions, perhaps through the
provision of salt licks or water sources (Altain Nuudelchid, personal
communication, May 21, 2015). While the professional organizations
involved in creating these management plans need not be directly connected to
the Institute of Biology under the Mongolian Academy of Science, about 50%
of the registered professional organizations are indeed connected to the
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Institute of Biology. Others are frequently connected to trophy hunting
companies. These professional organizations must be certified by the MEGDT
according to their human capacity, technical capacity, and methodology (Yo.
Onon, personal communication, May 27, 2015). Thus, while trophy hunting
was previously allowed anywhere except for protected areas and thus the areas
in which hunting was taking place were free from any directed management,
trophy hunting now takes place only in designated areas subject to a
management plan directed by a managing body and aided by a certified
professional organization.
The confinement of trophy hunting to specific areas equipped by
management plans is a significant improvement in Mongolia’s trophy hunting
system. Before these revisions, no management plans were being made for
wildlife populations, and no particular individual or body had responsibility
for the health of those populations. According to Yo. Onon, former senior
official for animal species management with the MEGDT, Mongolia has a
“very huge area and a small population. We cannot monitor, we cannot
manage a huge area.” Now, the relatively small area open for trophy hunting
makes this sort of management possible. By confining trophy hunting to
specific areas, the government has made it possible to actually monitor all
wildlife populations and land areas that may be subjected to trophy hunting.
This increased monitoring capability should make it possible for Mongolia’s
trophy hunting system to be more science-based and sustainable.
However, the system of hunting reserve area management is not
without flaws. Generally, the revised trophy hunting management system
suffers from poor implementation and low capacity across all types of hunting
management. Mongolia’s hunting reserve area system is only a few years old,
so as yet no management bodies have much experience in their roles. So far,
these hunting reserve management bodies have done a fairly poor job of
implementing the hunting management plans. Each year, the MEGDT rates
each hunting reserve area with a number from 0 to 5 according to the level of
implementation of its hunting management plan. In 2014, the MEGDT
awarded argali hunting reserve areas an average score of 1.62, falling between
a score of 1, meaning that the hunting reserve area has created a hunting
management plan but has not begun implementing it, and a score of 2,
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meaning that the management body has begun implementing a hunting
management plan, but has reached fewer than 20% of the goals in that plan
(MEGDT, 2015).
It is likely that the implementation of hunting management plans will
improve across hunting management areas as the system matures and hunting
management bodies grow more experienced in their roles. However, some
portion of this poor implementation likely relates to low capacity within the
bodies responsible for managing the hunting reserve areas. While hunting area
management contracts must currently be approved by the aimag’s
environmental agency, providing some measure of quality control over the
hunting area management bodies, the MEGDT should consider designing a
certification program for hunting reserve area management bodies. This
certification system would evaluate community groups, hunting companies,
and NGOs on their potential to successfully implement a hunting management
plan based on a review of the entity’s human capital, technical capacity, and,
if applicable, history of hunting management and conservation.
While such a certification system would help ensure that all hunting
reserve management bodies are qualified, it would particularly help to address
concerns over the use of trophy hunting companies as management bodies.
Currently, there is significant opposition to the role of trophy hunting
companies in management of hunting reserve areas, since these companies
might suffer from a conflict of interest. Indeed, these trophy hunting
companies profit from higher trophy hunting quotas, so they might have an
incentive to make management plans that involve unsustainably high offtake
levels, particularly if they have the freedom to move to another hunting area
after the expiration of their 10-year management contract. According to S.
Amgalanbaatar, a conservationist at the Argali Wildlife Research Center, “It
shouldn’t be the same people receiving quotas and making management
plans” (personal communication, May 16, 2015). However, a certification
system for hunting management bodies might help ensure that trophy hunting
companies only become hunting management bodies if they have
demonstrated the capacity and commitment for sustainable wildlife
management.
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B. System for Setting National Hunting Quotas
The creation of hunting reserve areas has also led to significant
improvements in the system for setting hunting quotas, or the number of
animals that can be hunted in a season. In the past, the national ministry for
environmental management, currently the MEGDT, was responsible for
proposing national trophy hunting quotas based on game population
inventories, advice from aimag governors, and input from the Mongolian
Academy of Sciences. Then, the ministry would pass these recommendations
to the Mongolian cabinet, which would set national quotas (Wingard and
Zahler, 2006). In the past, there was widespread concern that these quotas
were not scientifically-based or sustainable. First, while the ministry was
required to base quotas on recommendations from the Institute of Biology,
several studies in the early 2000s found that hunting quotas were being set
significantly above scientific recommendations. For example, Amgalanbaatar
et al. (2002) report that the argali quota was set at 80 for 2002, while the
Institute of Biology recommended only 60, and Wingard and Zahler (2006)
report that 2004 argali quotas were set at 80 for 2004, when the Institute of
Biology recommended only 40. Furthermore, even this input from the Institute
of Biology was only loosely science-based. While the old Law on Hunting
required the ministry to conduct game population surveys every 4 years
funded by the federal budget and hunting fees, such national surveys were
only conducted in 1975, 1985, 2001, 2002, and 2009, and only those
performed in 2002 and 2009 were performed using reproducible methods
(Frisina et al., 2010, B. Lhagvasuren, personal communication, May 8, 2015).
Thus, even the Institute of Biology’s recommendations were based on largely
out-of-date population information and guesswork.
Now, management bodies for hunting reserve areas are responsible for
doing population surveys each year with the help of a professional
organization; these studies then form the basis for hunting quotas. Typically,
hunting management bodies coordinate population studies done by volunteer
local rangers once each season, and then representatives from professional
organizations supervise a population study annually. These population studies
produce estimates of the herd’s total population, sex ratio, age structure, and
breeding rate. This professional organization is typically a group of scientists
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like the Institute of Biology, but it may also be a trophy hunting company.
Based on this population study, the hunting reserve area management body
then recommends a quota for the hunting area to the MEGDT. Next, the
ministry proposes a total national quota for trophy hunting of each species
based on these recommendations and input from the Institute of Biology. As
in the past, then, the ministry passes these recommendations to the Mongolian
cabinet, which decides official national quotas (L. Bayasgalan, personal
communication, May 7, 2015).
First, this revised system is an improvement on past methods in that it
involves local people in the process of setting quotas. Local people can
participate in population studies as volunteer rangers, increasing their stake in
the trophy hunting process. In Tsetseg soum, Altain Nuudelchid pays these
volunteer rangers a total of 80,000 ₮ each month for their work in population
censuses (D. Baigalmaa, personal communication, May 18, 2015). Thus, the
2012 revisions made quota-setting a source of both income and a sense of
partnership and involvement within local communities. Next, by determining
quotas based on focused, annual studies of animal populations in specific
hunting reserve areas rather than on outdated national data, the revised 2012
system allows for national quotas that are likely much more accurate than in
the past. Quotas for key species have fallen since the 2012 revisions, perhaps
approaching more ecologically appropriate levels (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. National Trophy Hunting Quotas 2009-2015
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Indeed, several conservationists with whom I spoke, including B.
Munkhchuluun of WWF and S. Amgalanbaatar of the Argali Research Center,
reported that recent quotas have been sustainable for wildlife populations and
no longer pose a threat to wildlife, and in particular, to argali (B.
Munkhchuluun, personal communication, May 21, 2015, S. Amgalanbaatar,
personal communication, May 16, 2015).
However, the new protocol for creating national trophy hunting quotas
is not yet without flaws. Most importantly, many interviewees with whom I
spoke voiced concerns that the quotas are still not sufficiently grounded in
accurate data on wildlife populations. L. Bayasgalan, current species specialist
with the MEGDT, says that the largest problem remaining in the trophy
hunting system is a lack of capacity for accurate population studies,
particularly at local levels (personal communication, May 7, 2015). Yo. Onon,
former senior official for animal species management with MEGDT, voiced
similar concerns, saying that while the trophy hunting system provides for a
high quantity of data on wildlife populations and distribution, the quality of
this data varies with both the professional organization leading the survey and
the volunteer rangers that assist in it (personal communication, May 13, 2015).
Moving forward, it will be important to ensure both that professional
organizations use sound methodology for population studies and that local
community members have the tools and training to contribute accurately to
these surveys. Furthermore, some conservationists remain concerned that
trophy hunting companies are sometimes involved in these population studies
as professional organizations. As in the creation of hunting management plans,
these companies suffer from an inherent conflict of interest. Thus, according
to S. Amgalanbaatar, it is crucial that in future all annual population surveys
be supervised by trained wildlife biologists (personal communication, May 16,
2015).
Next, there is some concern that by setting new quotas each year, the
ministry discourages the formation of longer-term contracts between hunting
reserve areas and hunting companies. That is, in any given year there is no
guarantee that the ministry will allocate licenses to that hunting reserve area
the next year, so a company cannot be confident that it will be able to continue
hunting in that area the next year or years beyond that. Thus, while some
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hunting reserve areas make multi-year contracts with hunting companies, as in
Gulzat, which makes 4-year contracts with hunting companies, others
continue to make annual contracts. Setting quotas for several years, rather than
every year, would facilitate the creation of multi-year contracts with hunting
companies, which might then encourage more sustainable behavior by those
companies. That is, since companies would be relying on the same game
populations and local community cooperation in future years, they would have
an incentive to ensure that they maintain sustainable wildlife offtake levels
and have a strong relationship with the local community. According to Yo.
Onon, former MEGDT specialist on trophy hunting, the ministry should set
maximum quotas for four-year periods, during which the hunting management
body for hunting reserve areas should determine the number of animals to be
hunted each year (personal communication, May 27, 2015).
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C. Allocation of Licenses to Hunting Companies
The system for then allocating these quotas to trophy hunting
companies has also changed. In the past, trophy hunting companies would
make contracts with soum governors before national quotas were set, and then
submit these contracts to the ministry. Then, after the cabinet decided national
quotas, the ministry would assign licenses directly to hunting companies
(Amgalanbaatar et al, 2002). According to Zorigt, who worked for Mongol
Tour and Juulchin for many years and now directs his own hunting company,
these assignments were not based on which companies were the best hunters
or which areas had the best management. Indeed, he said, “Who knew how
they chose companies?” (personal communication, May 22, 2015).
In the past, there was significant concern that the ministry was
assigning licenses to companies with no past experience in hunting. Indeed,
Amgalanbaatar et al. (2002) report that in 2002, only 12 of the 70 argali
licenses were assigned to companies that had hunted in the past, and B.
Lhagvasuren said that many trophy companies were actually UB-based hotel
or newspaper companies with no past hunting experience. These companies
could then sell these licenses to more experienced operators for a quick profit.
For example, Zakharenka (2007) reports that in 2007, the ministry initially
granted licenses to 45 companies, but these licenses ultimately were
transferred to 5 or 6 experienced operators. Besides facilitating this
widespread profiteering, this non-transparent system for distributing hunting
licenses also provided opportunities for corruption at higher levels. For
example, Amgalanbaatar et al. (2002) report that the Seruuleg newspaper
claimed in 2002 that only 70 of the 80 argali hunting licenses allowed for that
year had been assigned to trophy hunting companies, and that the remaining
ten would be distributed amongst Mongolian politicians.
Following the 2012 revisions, the ministry assigns licenses to hunting
reserve areas based on the recommendations made by the hunting reserve
management bodies. Then, the hunting reserve area management bodies
allocate licenses to trophy hunting companies by making trilateral contracts
including both the hunting company and the soum governor (B.
Munkhchuluun, personal communication, May 21, 2015). Since quotas are
now assigned to hunting areas rather than to hunting companies, the
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distribution of animal hunting around Mongolia is now tailored to the spatial
distribution of argali around the country, rather than on arbitrary allotments to
companies. Thus, provided that the hunting reserve area studies are
sufficiently science-based, this system for assigning quotas should produce a
distribution of trophy hunting that is more sustainable for animal populations.
Besides likely making quotas more sustainable, this new system gives
local areas much more power to ensure that they will be working with trophy
hunting companies that give back to the local community and wildlife
populations. While the old system relied on soum governors to choose trophy
hunting companies with whom to make contracts, hunting reserve area
management bodies now have the duty and capacity to choose responsible
hunting companies. Furthermore, while contracts between soum governors and
hunting companies in the past contained no requirements for hunting
companies to support local wildlife protection or community development,
these trilateral contracts now frequently include such requirements.
For example, when companies make contracts to hunt in Tsetseg soum,
they are required to give a donation to Altain Nuudelchid for each animal
hunted. For each argali hunted, for example, companies are required to donate
either $500 or 500,000 ₮. Then, 80% of this donation goes to improving
hunting management in the area, perhaps through population censuses,
improved living conditions for foreign hunters, or vehicles for rangers, and the
remaining 20% supports Altain Nuudelchid’s staff and activities (Altain
Nuudelchid, personal communication, May 21, 2015). Similarly, in Gulzat,
companies are required to donate $5000 to the community-based NGO
responsible for hunting management, all of which goes to the NGO’s
operating budget (B. Munkhchuluun, personal communication, May 21,
2015). Finally, in the hunting areas in which Zorigt’s hunting company
operates, his company is required to donate money to both community
development and hunting management in addition to fees owed to government
by law (Ph. Zorigt, personal communication, May 22, 2015). Thus, the 2012
revisions to the trophy hunting system have given local areas the tools to set
the terms of their relationships with trophy hunting companies.
Finally, the new license allocation system has reduced the potential for
corruption within the trophy hunting system. First, licenses now go only to
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experienced operators, rather than to UB-based companies seeking a quick
profit. That is, since companies are now chosen for their capacity to lead
hunts, work with local communities, and contribute to wildlife conservation,
rather than off of a list as in the past, companies with no hunting experience
are now “outside of trophy hunting management” (Yo. Onon, personal
communication, May 27, 2015). Next, there is much less opportunity for
upper-level government to give preferential treatment to certain operators
because the ministry no longer allocates licenses directly to companies. Local
governments now make final choices between trophy hunting operators, which
could theoretically give rise to corruption. However, hunting companies are
now given trophy hunting licenses through trilateral contracts, including both
the soum governor and the body responsible for management of the local
hunting reserve area. The presence of these three parties likely increases
accountability and significantly reduces the likelihood of corruption between
any two parties.
However, all of the benefits associated with giving hunting reserve
management bodies the power to choose responsible hunting companies,
particularly the potential to reduce corruption, will only be realized if those
management bodies have the capacity and the power to contribute to those
choices, which may often not be the case. For example, B. Munkhchuluun of
WWF reported that though the Gulzat Initiative NGO is the hunting
management body responsible for Gulzat, and thus should be involved in
choosing sound hunting companies, the soum governor in the area effectively
decides which hunting companies to hire without considering input from the
organization (personal communication, May 21, 2015). Such a situation
provides ample opportunity for corruption. This problem is particularly
prevalent in hunting reserve areas managed solely by community groups,
which may not have the capacity to make demands of hunting companies or to
evaluate the relative merits of different operators (Yo. Onon, personal
communication, May 27, 2105). In these cases, licenses may go to the hunting
companies with the best connections, rather than to the most responsible or
skilled operators.
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D. Structure and Recipients of Trophy Hunting Fees
Before the 2012 changes to the trophy hunting system, foreign hunters
paid two fees for trophy hunting, both of which went to the national budget.
These two fees were a reserve use fee, set at 60-70% of the current price of the
trophy or as established by the government, and a license payment, set at 2030% of the current price of the trophy or as established by the government.
Besides these fees paid to the government, trophy hunters also paid a
relatively small fee to the trophy hunting company. The actual fees paid for
trophy hunting were set by a government Resolution 264 in 2001. The total
fees paid by trophy hunters for a license to hunt Altai argali are highest,
reaching $20,000 per animal (Table 1).
Table 1. Trophy Hunting Fees for Prime Game Species
Game
Total Fees
Reserve Use
License
Species
Fee
Payment
Altai argali
$20,000
$14,000
$4,000
Gobi argali
$10,000
$7,000
$2,000
Altai ibex
$2,500
$1,500
$500
Gobi ibex
$2,200
$1,320
$440
Source: Government Resolution 264, Annex 4, 2001

Payment to
Company
$2,000
$1,000
$500
$440

Before the 2012 revisions to the trophy hunting system, the license payment
passed to the soum budget and the larger reserve use fee passed to the national
budget (Yo. Onon, personal communication, May 13, 2015). However, the
passage of the Public Sector Finance and Management Law in 2002
effectively redirected all funds for soum budgets back to the national budget.
This law, which was meant to distribute money evenly between soums,
consolidated local funding and budgets at the national level. Then, in
redistributing budgets, the national government would decrease a soum’s
allocation by the amount that it was expected to receive from hunting fees.
Thus, trophy hunting produced no net financial gains for the soums in which it
occurred. Indeed, there was no guarantee that all licenses would be sold, so a
soum with trophy hunting might be forced to operate on a smaller budget than
it would without trophy hunting (Amgalanbaatar et al., 2002). Amgalanbaatar
et al. (2002) report that due to this lack of financial benefit from trophy
hunting, there was significant opposition to trophy hunting within soums.
Apparently, some soum governors were even trying to convert their territory
to protected areas in order to ban trophy hunting.
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Following the 2012 amendments to hunting laws, the structure of

hunting fees has not changed. Companies still pay a hunting reserve use fee
and a license fee for each license they receive, and the amount of these fees
has not been updated since they were last set in 2001. However, the recipients
of these fees have changed drastically. While in the past all fees paid by
trophy hunting companies passed to the national budget, they now pass
directly to and remain in soum budgets (WWF Mongolia, 2013). This change
in the recipients of trophy hunting fees has been a major improvement in the
trophy hunting system. While soum governors used to actively oppose trophy
hunting in their territories, they now support it as a significant source of
revenue. According to the governor of Tsetseg soum, trophy hunting accounts
for 4% of the soum’s annual budget (personal communication, May 26, 2015).
Not only does trophy hunting now benefit the governments of the soums in
which it occurs, but the new system of fee allocation may also make the
system more ecologically sustainable. Since soums are tied financially to
trophy hunting under the revised system, they now have an incentive to ensure
that trophy hunting remains sustainable and thus continues producing
revenues to bolster their budgets.
However, the system of fees for trophy hunting is far from perfect.
First, the trophy hunting fees have now stayed constant for over a decade,
failing even to keep up with inflation. Indeed, if the total government fees for
an argali hunt had been adjusted for United States inflation, since most argali
hunts are sold to Americans, it would have increased from $20,000 in 2001 to
about $26,730 in 2015 (World Bank, 2015). As fees paid to the government
for trophy hunting stay constant each year, they diverge farther and farther
from the market value of a trophy hunt in Mongolia, or the price that foreign
hunters pay to hunting companies. By now, soum governments are receiving
only a small proportion of total revenue from trophy hunting.
Table 2. Comparison of Fees Paid to Government and Market Values
Game
Reserve Use Fee +
Market Value Percent of Fees Going
Species
License Payment
of Hunt
to Soum Governments
Altai argali
$18,000
$80,000
23%
Gobi argali
$9,000
$50,000
18%
Altai ibex
$2,000
$13,000
15%
Source: Yo. Onon, personal communication, May 27, 2015
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According to Yo. Onon, the government has received a particularly

small percentage of the money paid by foreign hunters since the 2012
revisions to the hunting system, when hunting quotas fell and the market value
of Mongolian trophy hunts rose significantly (personal communication, May
27, 2015). Currently, then, most of the revenue from trophy hunting is just
feeding high profits for hunting companies. In future, if trophy hunting is to
benefit wildlife and local communities to the greatest extent possible, it will
be important to redirect more of these funds from hunting companies to
whichever entity is currently responsible for providing funds for conservation
and community development, which is currently the government.
In particular, work should be done to better align trophy hunting fees
with the market value of trophy hunts. This adjustment could take several
forms. First, the government could simply define the hunting fees more
frequently, using information from the MEGDT on the market prices for
trophy hunts of different species. However, according to Yo. Onon, even this
information is vague and partially based on guesswork, since trophy hunting
companies do not publicly release the prices of their hunts (personal
communication, May 27, 2015). Alternatively, Mongolia could adopt a system
for defining the price of trophy hunts that relies on market forces. For
example, Mongolia could auction off hunting licenses, as has been done in
countries like Namibia (Yo. Onon, personal communication, May 27, 2015).
After receiving hunting license quotas from the MEGDT, hunting reserve
areas could auction these licenses off to hunting companies to then sell to
foreign hunters. Instead of subjecting all trophy hunts to static and inflexible
fees, this auction system would allow the cost of hunting licenses in each
hunting reserve area to reflect the market value of those trophy hunts, and
would capture these market values for the soum government rather than for
hunting companies. However, such an auction system might face legal
obstacles. According to former MEGDT official Yo. Onon, she tried to
implement such a system around 2007, but was unable to proceed because the
government is not legally permitted to hold auctions in Mongolia (personal
communication, May 27, 2015). However, under the revised trophy hunting
system, it might be possible for community-based organizations or local
NGOs to hold such auctions.
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E. Reinvestment of Trophy Hunting Revenue
However, any work to redirect funds from trophy hunting companies
to the government will only support wildlife conservation or community
development if there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the government
then spends these funds properly. Both the previous and the revised
Mongolian laws on trophy hunting have required that a certain portion of
revenue from trophy hunting be reinvested in wildlife conservation. In 1995,
the Hunting Fee Law required that 10% of the reserve use fees for trophy
hunting be transferred to an Environmental Protection Fund, from which they
should be reinvested in wildlife protection. Then, in 2000 the Law on
Reinvestment of Natural Resource Use Fees for the Protection the
Environment and the Restoration of Natural Resources was enacted,
increasing the amount to be reinvested to 50% of reserve use fees (Wingard
and Zahler, 2006). Since these reserve use fees passed to the national budget,
these laws obligated the ministry to reinvest large sums of money in wildlife
conservation.
However, there was very little evidence that the ministry was indeed
reinvesting funds of any significance in wildlife management. In 2002,
Amgalanbaatar et al. cited claims from the ministry that they spent thousands
of dollars on argali conservation each year by funding population surveys,
anti-poaching activities, habitat management and establishment of protected
areas, but they write that they “believe that little money from trophy hunting
has supported argali monitoring, conservation, research, or management” to
date (p. 139). In their 2006 Silent Steppe report, Zahler and Wingard write that
while hunting and saker falcon revenues totaled $4.1 million in 2003, and thus
more than $2 million should have been reinvested in wildlife conservation in
2004, the national government dedicated only $545,000 to conservation for all
natural resources, including wildlife, forests, water, land, and plants.
In the past, even that money which was supposedly spent on
conservation of game species like argali was primarily spent in ways only
tangentially related to those species. According to Andrew Zakharenka
(2008), about 90% of the revenues from hunting revenues reportedly spent on
wildlife management in 2005 and 2006 were dedicated to the management of
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newly established protected areas, where trophy hunting is not even allowed
(Table 3).
Table 3. Spending Report on Total Income from Argali Hunting and
Trapping Fees for 2005-2006, in $1000 USD
Activity
2005
2006
Research on Argali habitat and population
Research on other species (musk-deer, snow
leopard, marmot)
Anti-poaching and protection, equipment for selfdefense and communication
Argali management (equipment for self-defense
and communication, habitat protection, provision
of supplemental food sources)
Establishment and management of new protected
areas
Administration of hunting programs
TOTAL
Source: Zakharenka, 2008

5.0
6.0

6.0
28.0

7.2

9.0

2.5

4.0

200.0

210.0

0.4
221.1

0.4
247.4

Following the 2012 revisions to trophy hunting, the Law on Natural
Resource Use Fees requires that, as before, 50% of reserve use fees be
reinvested in wildlife conservation. In particular, these funds should be
dedicated to implementation of the hunting management plan. Thus, these
funds should go to things like protection of food and water sources for
wildlife, management of pasture use, and anti-poaching activities. Since these
revenues now pass to soum budgets, soums governments are responsible for
enforcing this reinvestment requirement.
The mechanism by which this money should be reinvested depends on
the structure of hunting management for the hunting reserve area. In many
areas, the local government should spend money directly on implementation
of the hunting management plan. In Tsetseg soum, where Altain Nuudelchid is
responsible for making a hunting management plan, the soum government
spends money to implement the hunting management independently of Altain
Nuudelchid (D. Baigalmaa, personal communication, May 18, 2015). In
Gulzat, the soum government should deposit at least 50% of trophy hunting
revenues into an environmental fund, from which they should then directly
spend money on the hunting management plan (B. Munkhchuluun, personal
communication, May 21, 2015). In the areas in which Ph. Zorigt’s hunting
company works, on the other hand, the hunting company, local government,
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and a group of local community members make spending decisions together.
The soum government deposits 50% of hunting revenues in a foundation
account along with the donations for hunting management from the hunting
company, which the government, hunting company, and a group of local
people then jointly allocate to aspects of the hunting management plan (Ph.
Zorigt, personal communication, May 22, 2015).
To date, it seems that there has been very poor enforcement of this
reinvestment requirement. While Zorigt, director of Ajiinbolor, a hunting
company, said that the soum governors in the areas in which his company
works contribute 50% of hunting revenues to wildlife protection, most people
with whom I spoke reported that very few soum governments reinvest as much
money as Mongolian law requires (Ph. Zorigt, personal communication, May
22, 2015). For example, a specialist for the Khovd Environment and Tourism
Agency said that in 2014, twenty-eight ibex were hunted in five soums around
Khovd. This volume of hunting generated 78 million ₮ for local budgets, so
39 million ₮ should have been spent on implementation of hunting
management plans. However, these soums collectively spent only about 16
million ₮ on wildlife conservation, or around 20% of the trophy hunting
revenues. In particular, the government of Must soum, where 11 ibex were
killed in 2014, spent only 5% of its revenue from trophy hunting on
implementation of hunting management plans in its hunting reserve areas
(personal communication, May 18, 2015).
Similarly, while the governor of Tsetseg soum asserts that the
government has indeed met the requirements for reinvestment, it seems that
little money from trophy hunting has gone directly to wildlife protection. The
governors claimed that Tsetseg had met its 50% reinvestment requirement, but
acknowledged that most of the revenue had not been spent specifically on
argali or ibex conservation. Rather, he claimed, Tsetseg has met its
reinvestment requirements by planting trees in the soum center, supplying
rangers with motorcycles, and repairing land from ninja mining (D.
Tsokhbadrakh, personal communication, May 26, 2015). Indeed, several
Tsetseg locals involved with trophy hunting reported that the Tsetseg
government has so far dedicated almost no money to wildlife conservation or
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implementation of the hunting management plan (personal communication,
May 20, 2015).
According to many people with whom I spoke, including
conservationists from WWF, several Tsetseg soum locals, and a local hunting
guide in Tsetseg, poor enforcement of this reinvestment requirement is the
primary flaw remaining in the trophy hunting system. The reinvestment of
trophy hunting revenue is arguably the most significant, and certainly the most
direct, method by which trophy hunting might support wildlife conservation,
so failing to follow through with it is largely nullifying the conservation
benefit of trophy hunting. If trophy hunting is to continue as a sustainable part
of conservation in Mongolia, it is crucial that we find some mechanism by
which to ensure that local governments reinvest trophy hunting revenue in
wildlife protection.
Many stakeholders attribute this lack of enforcement to the relative
newness of the system. Former MEGDT specialist Yo. Onon emphasized that
the laws on hunting were changed only two years ago, so “of course the level
[of enforcement] is low” (personal communication, May 27, 2015).
Baigalmaa, director of WWF’s Altai-Sayan field office, agreed that this poor
enforcement is largely a result of local government’s lack of experience with
trophy hunting revenues and hunting management, and she voiced hope that
soum governments’ compliance with the reinvestment law would improve
within a few years (personal communication, May 18, 2015). In particular, the
trophy hunting system is now so new that there has not yet been time to create
a body of legislation to regulate its implementation. According to
Munkhchuluun, a wildlife specialist at WWF, the primary obstacle to proper
reinvestment of trophy hunting revenue in Gulzat and other local areas is the
lack of regulation on spending by soum governments (personal
communication, May 21, 2015). Rather than relying on soum governors and
financial officials to spend trophy hunting revenues according to their
discretion, the ministry should require local governments to develop concrete
regulations for dedicating these funds to conservation as a prerequisite for
receiving trophy hunting licenses. The ministry should also institute a system
of annual audits to monitor the enforcement of these spending regulations.
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Furthermore, it will be important to create some enforceable

mechanism by which to encourage compliance or punish noncompliance with
the reinvestment law. Rather than relying on soums to voluntarily dedicate
50% of trophy hunting revenues back to wildlife conservation, the national
government should create a system of penalties for soums that do not reinvest
50% of hunting revenues in wildlife conservation. According to a specialist in
Khovd, no such penalty mechanism exists (personal communication, May 18,
2015). While both L. Bayasgalan and Yo. Onon, current and former species
officer at the MEGDT, claim that the ministry reviews soums’ reinvestment
and then adjusts license numbers accordingly, it seems that these adjustments
have not been significant enough to change soums’ behavior (personal
communication, May 7, 2015 and May 27, 2015). According to S.
Amgalanbaatar, the ministry should penalize noncompliance with the
reinvestment law by strengthening this penalty; he suggests that if soum
governments do not follow the reinvestment requirement, the MEGDT should
deny them all trophy hunting licenses for the next year (personal
communication, May 16, 2015). Alternatively, the national government could
penalize improper spending of hunting revenues through a financial
mechanism. For example, if the ministry’s audit found that a soum contributed
$10,000 less than required to hunting management, it could remove $10,000
from the soum’s budget allotment for that year.
Finally, it would be useful to encourage a more streamlined
reinvestment processes. That is, rather than relying on soum governments to
make a series of individual purchases or investments totaling to at least 50%
of trophy hunting revenues, it may be preferable for soum governments to
deposit the total sum in a fund or repository that is jointly supervised by the
hunting management body responsible for that soum. First of all, it would be
much easier to evaluate whether the soum government was fulfilling its
reinvestment obligations under a system based on a central repository for
hunting management funds than under one based on expenditures scattered
throughout the year. Such a system based on a central fund for hunting
management would also facilitate efficient expenditure on hunting
management. Rather than relying on several different bodies to independently
contribute to trophy hunting management and wildlife protection, as in
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Tsetseg soum, where both Altain Nuudelchid and the local governor claim to
have purchased new motorcycles for rangers, one body should be responsible
for allocating money from this central fund to implement the hunting
management plan (personal communication, May 21, 2015 and May 26,
2015). This body could be either the hunting management body alone or a
joint committee including some combination of government officials, the
hunting management body, and local citizens. Streamlining expenditure for
implementation of the hunting management plan in this way would likely
make the process more efficient, as well as making it easier to monitor the
total sum of money spent on implementation of the hunting management plan.
Besides these flaws in the implementation of the existing reinvestment
mechanism, this mechanism may be flawed in that it only provides funds for
conservation of the species being hunted in the location in which it is hunted.
Thus, while conservationists like Wingard and Zalher (2006) originally
intended trophy hunting to provide funding for all forms of wildlife protection
in Mongolia, the current system, even if perfectly implemented only provides
funding for protection of the target species in areas with trophy hunting. In
particular, the current trophy hunting regime does not provide funding for
Mongolia’s extensive network of protected areas, where trophy hunting is not
permitted, except to the extent that these areas include game species and might
be included in hunting management plans. In a 2013 report on protected areas,
WWF reports that the protected areas receive a budget of only $25/km2 per
year on average, a level of funding that “is inadequate and presents a serious
constraint to the capacity to manage” (pg. 12). Some, like Maroney (2006),
have suggested amending Mongolian law to allow sustainable trophy hunting
in protected areas as a source of funding for those areas, but others, like S.
Amgalanbaatar, argue that these changes would contradict the purpose of
protected areas and would hamper the develop of burgeoning photo-tourism
(personal communication, May 22, 2015). Barring the possibility of
introducing trophy hunting to protected areas, it would be beneficial to
develop a mechanism by which to divert some portion of trophy hunting
revenues to a centralized fund for protected area management or more general
wildlife protection.
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F. Involvement of Local Communities
In their 2007 article on trophy hunting in Africa, Lindsey et al. write
that the “greatest threat to the sustainability of trophy hunting on communal
land is the failure of governments and hunting operators to devolve adequate
benefits to local communities, which reduces incentives for rural people to
conserve wildlife” (pg. 2). Historically, one of the primary problems in
Mongolia’s trophy hunting system was that it offered very little benefit to
local communities. Not only did trophy hunting provide no financial benefit to
soum governments, but hunting companies hired few local people and thus
provided minimal benefits from employment. Furthermore, many local people
attributed declines in argali numbers in the past to trophy hunting, and they
resented the fact that only wealthy foreigners could afford to hunt the game
species (Amgalanbaatar et al., 2002).
The 2012 revisions to the trophy hunting system significantly
improved the benefit of trophy hunting to the local communities in which it
occurs. First of all, local communities are much more involved in the trophy
hunting system. First, the new system requires frequent monitoring of local
wildlife populations, for which hunting management bodies rely on the
participation of local herders as volunteer rangers (D. Baigalmaa, personal
communication, May 18, 2015). In Tsetseg soum, the local hunting guide and
trophy hunting coordinators with whom I spoke emphasized that they are
crucial to these studies, since they have a deep knowledge of the area and the
animal populations within it; while the professional agencies that come to
supervise these studies have technical expertise and scientific methodology for
these studies, they rely on local knowledge to execute this methodology
(personal communication, May 20, 2015). In this sense, the new trophy
hunting system validates the knowledge and experience of local community
members.
Furthermore, the new trophy hunting system often allows local
community members to participate in the management of hunting reserve
areas. Not only are some protected areas managed solely by community
groups, as in Gulzat, where about 60% of local herders participate in hunting
management (Munkhchuluun), but hunting management primarily supervised
by a local NGO or hunting company often includes local contributions as well.
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For example, in the areas managed by Ajiinbolor, Ph. Zorigt’s trophy hunting
company, Zorigt’s company cooperates with both the local government and
local community members in determining how to spend the money from a
foundation account on hunting management. After making these decisions, the
company then makes contracts with local people to implement various aspects
of the hunting management plan. According to Zorigt, the company typically
works with between 11 and 15 community members, hiring them to provide
salt licks and conduct anti-poaching activities (personal communication, May
22, 2015).
Besides sometimes involving local herders in implementation of the
hunting management plan, the revised trophy hunting system can provide
money for community development. While national law does not require
trophy hunting companies to contribute to community development, specific
hunting reserve areas can create such requirements. For example, in the areas
in which Zorigt’s company is responsible for hunting reserve management, his
company is responsible for donating money both to hunting management and
to community development (Ph. Zorigt, personal communication, May 22,
2015). In Gulzat, companies themselves are not required to donate money
directly to community development, but the government is required to spend
all revenue from trophy hunting that is not dedicated to hunting management
on community development. By creating a framework for contracts and
requirements like these, the new trophy hunting system has made it possible
for trophy hunting to fund improvements in local communities. According to
D. Munkhnast, a species officer with WWF, the new system’s potential for
local participation and investment in the community has revolutionized the
system’s relationship with local communities: “If you live in the game reserve
area, you are lucky. According to the revised law, you will benefit from the
trophy hunting activity” (personal communication, May 9, 2015).
However, there is room for significant improvement in the role of local
communities in trophy hunting. First of all, it seems that most community
members are very detached from trophy hunting in their communities. In
Tsetseg soum, nearly every community member with whom I spoke
commented that local people know nothing about trophy hunting in Tsetseg.
While they may see foreign hunters or serve them food in a restaurant, most
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community members know nothing of how much money these hunters pay or
of where that money goes. Many people also commented that they know
nothing of how many animals trophy hunters are killing each year. While
some Tsetseg locals expressed outright animosity to trophy hunting,
complaining that only foreigners can hunt Mongolia’s natural birthright or that
they receive no benefit from hunting, most expressed only ignorance about the
system (personal communication, May 19, 2015 and May 20, 2015). In the
future, hunting reserve area management bodies should make it a priority to
educate local communities about trophy hunting, since that knowledge will be
crucial to local participation.
Not only will local communities need to be better informed about
trophy hunting systems, but they must also be better integrated into those
systems. Indeed, in some soums, hunting companies seem not to be working
well with local communities. For example, there is significant tension between
local community members and Altain Nuudelchid, the NGO responsible for
hunting management in Tsetseg soum. According to a representative from
Altain Nuudelchid, the organization’s primary problem is that they are
constantly receiving requests for money from local community groups seeking
to manage the wildlife themselves. Altain Nuudelchid apparently never grants
these requests, preferring to give community groups methodology or tools
(personal communication, May 21, 2015). The organization’s refusal to
entrust money to community groups has created resentment among local
people. When I spoke with a local hunting guide, he expressed skepticism that
money from trophy hunting would ever go to wildlife protection, not because
the government is failing to meet its reinvestment requirement, but rather
because Altain Nuudelchid never gives community groups money to
implement what they see as necessary for wildlife protection (personal
communication, May 20, 2015). Tsetseg’s governor also pointed out this rift,
saying that in the future Altain Nuudelchid needs to better work with local
herders, who could prove to be an excellent resource for hunting management
(personal communication, May 26, 2015). Indeed, trophy hunting in Tsetseg
will only be sustainable if all stakeholders, including local community groups,
feel like valued participants.
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More generally, many conservationists and officials with whom I

spoke agreed that local communities are currently held back from fully
participating in the trophy hunting industry because they lack capacity.
According to D. Tsogbadrakh, governor of Tsetseg soum, most local residents
do not have the business skills, ecological knowledge, or familiarity with
western living standards and customs to deal directly with trophy hunters or as
permanent employees of hunting companies (personal communication, May
26, 2015). Thus, hunting companies continue to only permanently hire a few
local community members. While many Tsetseg locals had worked with
trophy hunters at one time or another, like one woman who had once served a
group of trophy hunters in her ger restaurant and one man who had worked as
a local hunting guide for a few hunting trips in the 1980s, almost everyone
with whom I spoke commented that trophy hunting had made a few people in
the community rich while leaving everyone else behind (personal
communication, May 19, 2015 and May 20, 2015). Moving forward, it will be
important to find ways to involve a larger proportion of the community in
trophy hunting in a significant way. For example, local NGOs or hunting
companies could provide training in wildlife management to enhance
community members’ capacity to help implement the hunting management
plan, and local governments could use trophy hunting fees or donations from
hunting companies to fund business education courses, improving the capacity
of local people to provide services to foreign hunters.
While it may be possible to significantly improve community
involvement within the existing trophy hunting system, many conservationists
hope to ultimately move to a program based almost entirely on local
communities, as Schuerholz (2001) and Amgalanbaatar et al. (2002) suggested
in the early 2000s. Today, wildlife conservationists like D. Baigalmaa and Yo.
Onon from WWF speak of such a system as a possibility ten or twenty years
from now (personal communication, May 18, 2015 and May 27, 2015). A
community-based trophy hunting system would be similar to that currently in
force in Gulzat, where a community-based group is responsible for managing
hunting reserve areas and executing wildlife population studies, though with
advise and oversight from a professional organization. In the long run,
however, several important changes could be made. First, trophy hunting
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could provide much more benefit to local communities if they were able to
market hunts directly to foreign hunters, rather than working through hunting
companies. While this change would require a significant increase in local
community’s capacity both to deal with foreign markets and to coordinate
hunters’ trips from Ulaanbaatar to rural areas, it would redirect the large sums
paid by trophy hunters from companies’ profits to funds for wildlife
conservation and community benefit. Next, while the Mongolian government
currently owns the country’s wildlife, conservationists around the world argue
that devolvement of wildlife ownership to local communities substantially
increases the benefit of trophy hunting to those communities and creates a
strong incentive to ensure sustainable management (Lindsey et al., 2007).
While such a change might pose significant legislative and logistical
problems, particularly in a country where land is state-owned and the wildlife
could not be fenced in, community-based ownership of the game could make
Mongolia’s trophy hunting system significantly more sustainable, both for
wildlife and local communities.
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VIII. Conclusions
In 2012, the Mongolian government made a series of major revisions
to the country’s trophy hunting system. According to these revisions, trophy
hunting is now restricted to reserved areas under the surveillance of a
management body, which can be a local NGO, a community-based
organization, a hunting company working with a community-based
organization, or a hunting company alone. While in the past the MEGDT set
national quotas based on sparse national data and then distributed licenses to
individual hunting companies, the ministry now determines national quotas
based on annual studies of wildlife population in hunting reserve areas, and
then assign hunting licenses to these areas. The management bodies of these
hunting reserve areas then make tri-lateral contracts, including hunting
companies and the soum governor, for hunting rights in those areas. The fees
for trophy hunting have not changed since the 2012 revisions, but while they
used to pass to the national MEGDT, they now go to soum budgets. Then,
soum governments are required to spend 50% of trophy hunting revenues on
implementation of the hunting management plan, just as the MEGDT was
required to spend 50% of hunting revenue on wildlife protection in the past.
Have these changes brought Mongolia’s trophy hunting system closer
to being a source of protection for wildlife, rather than a threat? Again, trophy
hunting can only fulfill this role if it is based on accurate wildlife monitoring,
involves mechanisms to redirect revenue back to wildlife protection, has
community participation and support, and is implemented by capable
stakeholders. Indeed, the 2012 revisions to Mongolia’s trophy hunting system
have brought it much closer to meeting these criteria.
First, while in the past the opportunity for corruption in the trophy
hunting system compromised the system’s potential to work for the best of
wildlife populations, the new system of allocating licenses to hunting reserve
areas rather than directly to companies, and then to companies only through
trilateral contracts, has reduced that possibility. More significantly, the
revisions to the hunting system have improved the relationship between trophy
hunting and the local communities in which it occurs, largely by encouraging
local participation in decision-making and implementation of hunting
management. In some hunting reserve areas, local community members are
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part of the hunting reserve management body, either as part of communitybased management or as members of a partnership with a trophy hunting
company. Even in areas where community groups are not officially involved
in hunting management, community members are often hired as volunteer
rangers to assist in wildlife population studies or to implement aspects of
hunting management plans. Next, the revised trophy hunting system has
significantly improved the financial benefit of trophy hunting to local
communities. Not only do all trophy hunting fees now go to soum budgets, but
the new system of choosing and making contracts with trophy hunting
companies gives local communities the power to set the terms of their
relationships with hunting operators. While increasing the benefit of trophy
hunting to local communities is an improvement in itself, it has also
contributed to the sustainability of trophy hunting for wildlife populations by
increasing local peoples’ incentives to preserve the game populations that
provide these benefits.
The 2012 revisions to trophy hunting have also strengthened the
system’s ecological sustainability by creating the opportunity for much more
targeted management of wildlife populations and hunting levels. While trophy
hunting was once allowed anywhere in Mongolia except for protected areas,
its confinement to smaller areas with management bodies has made it possible
to directly monitor and manage all animal populations that are subject to
trophy hunting. Instead of relying on the national ministry to manage all
wildlife, this new system delegates responsibility to bodies that can tailor
management and protection plans to specific areas. In particular, the creation
of these hunting zones has made it possible to develop hunting quotas that are
actually tailored to the distribution of wildlife populations around Mongolia,
rather than being based on out-of-date national data and guesswork.
By making Mongolia’s trophy hunting system more sustainable for
wildlife populations and more tied to local communities, these revisions have
indeed brought Mongolia’s trophy hunting system much closer to being an
effective part of wildlife protection. However, it is not there yet. First,
Mongolia’s trophy hunting system currently suffers from a major lack of
capacity among stakeholders, largely because it is still so new. For example,
while the system provides the opportunity for strong area-specific
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management of wildlife populations, the bodies tasked with this management
may lack the financial and technical skills to effectively design and implement
a hunting management plan. Furthermore, while the new system of annual
population studies in each hunting reserve area should provide a strong
scientific basis for hunting quotas, both the professional organizations and the
local rangers that perform these studies may not have the scientific and
practical knowledge to make them accurate. Ensuring that Mongolia’s trophy
hunting fulfills its potential as a tool for wildlife conservation will require
improving stakeholder capacity at all levels, perhaps through a certification
program for management bodies or workshops for local rangers, for example.
Next, while trophy hunting’s relationship to local communities has
been one of the system’s primary improvements, it seems that these ties are
not yet strong enough to sustain trophy hunting as a tool for conservation into
the future. Based on my observations of Tsetseg soum, more work must be
done to ensure that local community members are both informed about trophy
hunting in their areas and feel that their input to wildlife protection and
hunting management is valued. While community members now participate in
hunting management in some areas, they should be involved in the
management of all hunting reserves in future, either as an independent entity
or in a partnership with a company or local NGO. Ultimately, trophy hunting
might best protect wildlife in Mongolia through a system of community-based
trophy hunting management, where local community members would manage,
and perhaps even own, wildlife, though such a system would take significant
time and effort to develop.
The primary problem preventing Mongolia’s trophy hunting system
from supporting wildlife protection is that the existing mechanism for
reinvestment of trophy hunting revenues in conservation has not been
implemented. While soum governors are required to devote 50% of trophy
hunting revenues to implementation of the hunting management plan,
conservationists and official report that little money has gone to wildlife
protection so far. As long as soum governments disregard this requirement and
fail to reinvest trophy hunting revenue in wildlife protection, trophy hunting
has little potential to protect animal populations. Moving forward, it will be
crucial to both require the establishment of local finance regulations and
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national penalty mechanisms to ensure that soum governments spend trophy
hunting revenues properly. Once money from trophy hunting is indeed going
to wildlife protection, the Mongolian government should reset trophy hunting
fees or alter the mechanism by which fees are set to better align them with the
market value of trophy hunts, thus redirecting money from hunting
companies’ profits to wildlife conservation. Even if the current reinvestment
mechanism were perfectly enforced and based on updated fees, however, it
would only provide funding for conservation of the game species in areas that
benefit from trophy hunting. In order for trophy hunting revenues to support
conservation in Mongolia more broadly, it might be necessary to develop a
mechanism by which to divert some portion of trophy hunting revenue to a
central fund, which could then be used to support conservation in protected
areas or for non-game species.
Thus, while the 2012 revisions to Mongolia’s trophy hunting
significantly improved the system’s potential to support wildlife conservation,
reducing the potential for corruption, increasing its ecological sustainability,
and linking it more closely to local communities, it will not effectively support
wildlife conservation until stakeholders’ capacity increases, local community
members feel involved and valued, and reinvestment mechanisms are
enforced. Progress has been made, but work on Mongolia’s trophy hunting
system is far from complete. In particular, while I have made a series of broad
recommendations here, there is still much research to be done to identify the
best ways to address these remaining problems. For example, what mechanism
can be designed to enforce the reinvestment requirement for trophy hunting
revenues? What specific changes can be made in the allocation of hunting
revenues so that they benefit conservation in Mongolia more generally? How
would a community-based trophy hunting management program function, and
what legal changes would be required to fully implement such a program?
While it will take time to both identify and implement these changes, doing so
is crucial to the long-term sustainability of Mongolia’s trophy hunting system.
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X. Appendix A: Sample Interview Questions for Ulaanbaatar-Based
Interviewees
Sample Interview Questions for Wildlife Conservationists, Government
Officials, and Biologists
1. Are populations of most wildlife species decreasing or increasing in
Mongolia? What are the biggest threats to wildlife in Mongolia today?
What species are most at risk?
2. Will Mongolia’s continuing development create more threats for
wildlife populations? Infrastructure from mining, roads etc.?
3. Do you think that the Mongolian government is effectively managing
and protecting wildlife populations? Why or why not?
4. Do you think that the trophy hunting system is currently wellmanaged? Do you think it improved following the 2012 revisions?
5. My understanding is that the MEGDT is supposed to take input from
the Institute of Biology in determining quotas. Is that happening?
6. Do you think that the trophy hunting system is ecologically
sustainable? Do you think that offtake levels are appropriate?
7. Do you think that the system of annual population studies in hunting
reserve areas is working well? In particular, do you think trophy
hunting companies can do reliable population surveys?
8. I believe that Mongolian law requires that data on animal populations
and trophy hunting harvests be in a publicly accessible depository. Is
that happening?
9. I have heard that one benefit of trophy hunting that is frequently
proposed is that it could provide funding for conservation activities
and research on the target species. Do you agree with that concept?
10. Do you think that is happening in Mongolia? Is revenue from trophy
hunting going to wildlife conservation or research? Are local
governments following the 50% reinvestment law?
11. Do you think there is any corruption in the trophy hunting system, and
have the 2012 revisions reduced the potential for corruption?
12. Do you think that the 2012 revisions have improved the benefit of
trophy hunting to local communities? Do you think that is enough, or
does more work remain to be done to improve the benefit to local
communities?
13. Do you think there’s any possibility of actually giving ownership of
wildlife to local community groups? Do you think that would be a
positive thing for Mongolia?
14. Do you think the trophy fees need to be raised to reduce the profit that
companies can make and divert some of that profit to the state?
15. Are there still any concerns about operators doing illegal things, like
driving animals out of protected areas or onto hunting reserves?
Hunting from vehicles etc.?
16. Do you think a certification program based on hunting companies’ past
records of anti-poaching work, investing in local communities,
following good hunting practices etc. would be a positive thing for
Mongolia’s trophy hunting system?
17. What obstacles are there to a program like that?
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18. Do you think it is a problem that revenue from trophy hunting is not
going to general wildlife conservation or protected areas? If so, how
could it be rectified?
19. In general, do you think trophy hunting is protecting species or serving
as another threat to them?

Sample Interview Questions for Hunting Company Representatives
1. Where does your trophy hunting company work? Is your company
responsible for hunting management in that area?
2. Does your company typically hire people from the local communities
to help guide the hunts, skin animals, work at the hunting camps etc.?
3. How does your company relate to or work with the local community in
which you hunt?
4. How much revenue does the trophy hunting industry generate in
Mongolia each year?
5. Is trophy hunting a profitable industry for trophy hunting companies?
6. Is it still true that there are many more hunting companies seeking
licenses than there are licenses available?
7. Is trophy hunting a risky or reliable industry for trophy hunting
companies?
8. Do most trophy hunting companies that are being given licenses have
experience with trophy hunting?
9. What countries do most trophy hunters come from? Are they mostly
men?
10. Do most trophy hunting companies have hunting camps in local areas?
Do hunting companies work in particular areas for many years, or do
they tend to move around?
11. Are there any requirements for hunting companies to invest in the local
community or hire local community members? If not, do any
companies do so voluntary?
12. Is poaching a major problem for trophy hunting operators? Do trophy
hunting companies ever voluntarily do anti-poaching work?
13. I understand that hunting reserve areas are responsible for doing
population surveys every year. I have heard that trophy hunting
companies sometimes are responsible for these population studies. Is
that true?
14. Have you noticed any change in wildlife populations in recent years?
Has it gotten easier or harder to hunt animals?
15. Do you think that the current trophy hunting system is well managed?
If you are familiar with the 2012 revisions to the Law on Fauna, do
you think they improved the trophy hunting system?
16. What issues do you think remain in trophy hunting management?
17. Many conservationists say that trophy hunting can support wildlife
conservation by generating revenue for conservation programs. Do you
see trophy hunting as part of conservation efforts?
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XI. Appendix B: Sample Interview Questions for Khovd-Based
Interviewees
1. How long has there been trophy hunting in Khovd? What species do
trophy hunters hunt in this area?
2. What are the biggest threats to wildlife populations in Khovd? Which
species are most at risk?
3. How have animal populations changed over recent years? Why have
they been changing?
4. How many soums in Khovd allow trophy hunting? About how many
animals are hunted each year?
5. About how much revenue does trophy hunting bring to Khovd?
6. Are you familiar with the revisions made to the trophy hunting system
in 2012? Do you think those changes were improvements?
7. Who is responsible for trophy hunting management in Khovd?
8. Do you think that trophy hunting quotas are appropriate and
sustainable for wildlife populations in this area?
9. Are you familiar with the hunting management plans in this area?
What do they include?
10. Are the hunting management plans being implemented? Is money from
trophy hunting being reinvested in wildlife protection?
11. Is there any corruption in the trophy hunting system?
12. Have the same hunting companies worked in Khovd for a long time?
13. Do trophy hunting companies devote any money to community
development? Do they engage in anti-poaching?
14. Do you think that trophy hunting benefits local communities? What do
local community members think of trophy hunting?
15. Are there any problems remaining in Mongolia’s trophy hunting
system? If so, how can they be addressed?
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XII. Appendix C: Sample Interview Questions for Tsetseg-Based
Interviewees
Sample Interview Questions for Tsetseg Locals Connected to Trophy Hunting
in Tsetseg:
1. What are the primary wildlife species in Khovd? What are the largest
threats to wildlife?
2. How have wildlife populations changed over time in this area?
3. What hunting companies work in Tsetseg soum? Have they worked
there for a long time?
4. About how many hunters come to Tsetseg each year? What countries
do they come from? What animals do they hunt?
5. Do the hunting companies work from hunting camps? Are these camps
permanent, or do they change every year?
6. What are the hunting quotas for this year? How have the quotas
changed over time? Do you think that the hunting quotas are
sustainable?
7. Are you familiar with the 2012 changes to the trophy hunting system?
Do you think those changes were improvements?
8. How often does the management body do wildlife population studies?
Who is involved in these studies?
9. Do trophy hunting companies hire people from the local community?
How many people do they permanently hire?
10. Are there any problems with poaching in Tsetseg? Is poaching a
problem for trophy hunting companies?
11. Does the Tsetseg government reinvest 50% of trophy hunting revenues
in implementation of the hunting management plan? If so, what kinds
of things do they fund?
12. Are there ever concerns of hunters doing illegal things, like perhaps
driving animals into hunting reserve areas?
13. Do you think trophy hunting benefits Tsetseg soum? Do you think
most people like or dislike having trophy hunters come?
14. What problems do you think remain in Mongolia’s trophy hunting
system?
Sample Interview Questions for Tsetseg Locals Not Directly Connected to
Trophy Hunting:
1. How long have you lived in Tsetseg soum? Do you think wildlife
populations are increasing or decreasing?
2. Are you aware of foreign hunters coming to Tsetseg? If so, for how
long have you been aware of them?
3. Have you ever worked with the foreign hunters?
4. Do you know about how many trophy hunters come to Tsetseg each
year? Do you know how many animals they kill each year?
5. Do you know if any money from trophy hunting is going to fund
wildlife protection or community development?
6. Do you think that trophy hunting is good for Tsetseg soum? Do you
like that foreign hunters come to Tsetseg?

	
  
Sample Interview Questions for Tsetseg Government Officials:
1. How long have you lived in Tsetseg? How long have you been
involved in government in Tsetseg?
2. Do you think that wildlife populations in Tsetseg are increasing? Do
you think that it is important to protect wildlife populations?
3. What do you think are the biggest threats to wildlife populations?
Which species are most at risk?
4. Does Tsetseg have trophy hunting? Do you know how long there has
been trophy hunting in Tsetseg?
5. Do you think that trophy hunting is a threat to local argali and ibex
populations?
6. Are you familiar with the changes made to the trophy hunting system
in 2012? Do you think that these changes were improvements?
7. Do you think that Altain Nuudelchid does a good job of managing
trophy hunting in the area?
8. Have long have you worked with these trophy hunting companies?
9. Do you think trophy hunting is a good thing for Tsetseg soum?
10. Does revenue from trophy hunting go to the soum budget? How much
of the soum’s budget comes from trophy hunting?
11. Are you required to spend some of that money on wildlife protection?
12. Does the soum spend the required 50% on wildlife protection? What
do you spend it on? If not, why not?
13. Is the local community involved with trophy hunting at all?
14. Do you think trophy hunting benefits the local community in Tsetseg
soum? How?
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